The global oil crisis that wasn’t.
Closing the Strait of Hormuz was supposed to cripple economies worldwide. It didn’t. Why?
In October 1973, Arab nations in the Middle East imposed an
embargo on oil exports, targeting western nations that had supported Israel in
that year’s Yom Kippur war.
It was a disaster for the global economy. The price of oil
quadrupled and shortages produced long queues of cars outside the petrol
stations of the world. Barely any country, from the US to the Soviet Union,
escaped economic injury. For the next 20 years prices were fairly stable – but
then the boom in world commodities sent prices skywards until the Global
Financial Crisis blew everything up. After that, and despite volatility, prices
went sideways as demand for oil weakened and a glut slowly developed.
Despite the rise of renewables, oil remains by far the
world’s most important energy source. There are alternatives, but those will
take many years to overtake oil and other fossil fuels.
In February 2026, Donald Trump started a war against Iran
without, apparently, understanding that it would close the Strait of Hormuz
linking the Persian Gulf with the rest of the world and blocking a quarter of
the world’s seaborne oil supplies. For a short time, prices shot up, from
around $US65 a barrel in February to a peak of $US113 in March.
But the panic didn’t last. This “crisis” was quite unlike
the ones in the 1970s or even the GFC two decades ago. Even though the Strait
of Hormuz remained closed to all but a trickle of traffic, the oil price fell
again. This time, the world can cope.
Wars have the effect on oil prices that they always have, but
the spike which accompanied the second
stage of Putin’s Ukraine adventure in 2022 soon began to wane. Since these
figures were reported, the jump caused by Trump’s Iranian escapade has, at the
time of writing, almost disappeared.
There are three basic reasons why oil crises are harder to
come by these days: supply chains can be more readily shuffled around the
globe; oil is being used more efficiently; and cheaper, cleaner alternatives
have emerged.
The supply shift
The International Energy Agency’s regular oil market report shows
how quickly adjustments were made.
“With Hormuz tanker traffic still restricted,” the report
said, “cumulative supply losses from Gulf producers already exceed 1 billion barrels
with more than 14 mb/d of oil now shut in, an unprecedented supply shock. The
current supply-demand gap is significantly smaller, however, as the market was
already in surplus heading into the crisis while producers and consumers alike
are responding to market signals …
“On the supply side, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have
successfully redirected some exports to terminals loading outside of the
Strait. At the same time, stocks from commercial and government strategic
storage sites in consuming countries are flowing into markets to offset part of
the losses.”
Though oil reserves were tapped and quickly declined, demand
has also sharply fallen. Refineries have scaled back and end-users are cutting
their consumption, putting downward pressure on prices.
“Aviation activity is also running well below normal levels,
helping to ease some of the pressure on jet fuel prices, which nearly tripled
after Middle Eastern exports were cut off,” the agency said. “Higher prices, a deteriorating
economic environment and demand-saving measures will further weigh on global
oil consumption.”
Efficiency
For decades, and particularly since global warming became a
major issue, manufacturers and consumers have improved the efficiency with
which oil is used, getting more energy out of less oil.
There’s a measure for this: energy intensity. It’s the ratio
between energy input and economic output.
In the century’s first two decades, efficiency improvements
in the IEA’s 32 member states saved around 24% of energy use. That’s as much as
the whole energy consumption of India. Greater efficiency in industry and
services accounted for 58% of those savings, energy-saving buildings 23% and more
efficient transport 19%.
Improvement in efficiency have massively reduced consumption
from what it would have been otherwise. In most developed countries, each
person used substantially less in 2024 than in 1970: in Denmark, there was a
fall of almost two-thirds. In China and India, industrialisation and getting hundreds of
millions of people out of poverty has inevitably increased energy use.
Industrial development in emerging economies has come at a
cost. Over the past 55 years, world fossil fuel consumption – oil, coal and gas
– followed two rough plateaus. The current plateau, starting at the turn of the
new century, is 12% higher than the last.
Cleaner alternatives
The decline in fossil fuel use is almost solely confined to
coal, and the change is most clearly see in electricity generation. Britain has
shut its coal-fired power stations, replacing the shortfall with renewables.
Oil and gas are largely unchanged.
The United States has significantly decreased its use of oil
– in most cases, diesel – but the volumes are so low that it doesn’t make much
difference. Coal has been replaced by gas. Renewables have along way to go.
Australia is one of the world’s biggest producers and
consumers of coal. But the decline in coal as a source of energy has mostly
been replaced by renewables rather than gas. Diesel is so expensive that its
use in electricity generation is relatively price-inelastic: it’s always so
expensive that you don’t use it for this purpose unless you have to.
Electric vehicles are the greatest threat to the use of oil
in transport, but they will take many years to replace existing fleets. Even
now, only about a quarter of global new car sales are for battery or hybrid
vehicles. An existing petrol or diesel vehicle represents a large capital
investment with, in most cases, a long life still ahead of it.
Most fuel is consumed by cars and trucks. This forecast from
Bloomberg researchers may or may not be accurate; but even if it is, half of
all these vehicle types will still be run on petrol or diesel.
A longer-term forecast, from the International Energy
Agency, predicts major changes in car fleets but much slower declines in
trucks. Any change in aviation or shipping will depend on technologies that do
not yet exist – and may never exist.
Chinese manufacturers dominate the international market for
electric cars. There are some 50 brands, many of which are losing money: under
this stiff competition, and despite subsidies being rolled back, prices are
low. A BBC report
quoted one customer in China saying: "I drive an electric vehicle because
I am poor." It’s a common refrain.
The cost of petrol is a significant factor in the take-up of
electric vehicles. The price factor has gained even more momentum following the
wars in Ukraine and the Middle East.
But governments are at least as much to blame for high
petrol prices as the war in the Middle East. A plethora of national and state
charges complicates the situation, but in most western countries, at least half
the cost to consumers goes in tax.
There’s a problem here for government budgets. It’s easy to
slap a tax on petrol and diesel but much harder to do so with electricity.
Drivers of petrol cars pay; EV drivers don’t.
In the end, the battle will be won by the technology
providing the best value for the consumer’s money. Battery technology is still
in its infancy and, in time, the current lithium-ion batteries will be
replaced. Sodium
ion is the next big thing: much cheaper and much less reliant on rare
earths, which are so dominated by China. Right now, Chinese manufacturers
account for 95% of existing sodium battery production but that may not last.
As with many new technologies, many shake-out events are
ahead that could render existing factories and supply chains obsolescent.
Lithium ion will be the first to go. Big bets on capital investment are being
made and not all of them will pay off.
But even now, any significant long-term decline in oil
demand has the potential of upending that entire market. When demand falls
below supply, prices fall. That will push marginally profitable suppliers out
of business: in this case, shale oil and ethanol producers are most vulnerable,
as are refineries with low profit margins. In this case, lower fuel prices may
not encourage drivers to buy more petrol or to buy more petrol-driven cars.
Fleet owners, particularly, look at overall costs for the life of a vehicle;
and even if petrol prices fall enough to compete with electricity, maintenance
costs and capital outlay may tip the balance against oil.
This may not be the best time to buy shares in an oil company.













