Loss of vision.
Australia’s leaders forgot how to lead.
When Paul Keating moved out of the Prime Ministerial Lodge in Canberra on 21 March 1996 after showing John Howard around, a period of reform and vision ended and a new era of Australian political history began.
In all those 30 years, the ideas and promise of that period have never been recovered.The story begins long before that time. It’s the story of
how imagination and purpose created a new and better nation, and how that sense
of purpose became corrupted, turning in upon itself as ideas of bold and risky
reform gave way to comfortable stasis.
It had happened before. In 1949 the Liberal Party, created
by Robert Menzies out of the shards of previous conservative groupings, gained
power and stayed there for the next 23 years. The most notable event of its
time in office was the attempt to ban the Communist Party.
Australian communists were far from the bomb-throwing
murderers of popular imagination but they had gained power and influence in the
trade union movement and in academia, but not in mainstream politics. They were
riven by schism, particularly after Russia’s invasion of Hungary in 1957. Their
real influence on Australian affairs was, at most, minimal.
But mere reality did not prevent the communists from being
used as a convenient scapegoat. In 1951, just a year after Menzies became prime
minister, the Communist Party Dissolution Act passed the federal parliament.
But it wasn’t as simple as it looked: the High Court ruled that the Act was
unconstitutional and a referendum seeking the power to ban communists, was
rejected – albeit narrowly – by the Australian people.
Some of those reforms were rolled back by the Fraser Liberal
government after Whitlam’s dismissal by the governor-general in 1975. But most
of those were reinstated by the longer-lived Hawke-Keating government, elected
in 1983.
Hawke and Keating, even more than Whitlam, changed
Australia. That 13 years was the longest period any Labor government had spent
in office. Perhaps most significantly, that government, with Paul Keating as
Treasurer and then as Prime Minister, radically changed the nation’s financial
structure. The dollar was floated, no longer tied to either the British pound
or the US dollar. Compulsory superannuation was introduced: the pool of
retirement savings now
stands at around $4.5 billion. Regulations limiting the role of banks were
wound back. Fringe benefits and capital gains were taxed for the first time.
Tariffs were slashed, opening up the economy to competition. And industrial
relations shifted from centralised wage-fixing to a system based on each
enterprise, and on a wages and prices accord signed with the unions that
limited pay increases in exchange for a better “social wage” – including
Medicare and public education.
Then, in 1996, it stopped. John Howard, the incoming Liberal
Prime Minister, described himself as the most conservative leader the Liberal
Party had ever had. A decade earlier, he joined in the Asian immigration debate
on the side of Geoffrey Blainey and Pauline Hanson. Howard used carefully coded
language:
“I wouldn’t like to see it get greater,” he said. “I do
believe that in the eyes of some in the community it’s too great, it would be
in our immediate term interest and supportive of social cohesion if it were
slowed down a little, so that the capacity of the community to absorb was
greater.”
In few other areas of policy has the gulf between the two
sides of Australian politics been more pronounced. Bob Hawke, as Labor Prime
Minister, embodied the opposite attitude to Howard’s: generous rather than
mean, open rather than closed, welcoming rather than rejecting.
“The web of consensus that protected and fostered these
principles [of multiculturalism] for so long,” Hawke said in 1988, the
bicentennial year, “has been tragically and dramatically ruptured by some
members of the opposition parties who should have had the wisdom to avoid that
rupture. The opposition parties have allowed the extreme views of a minority to
fuel the same groundless fears and prejudices that spawned the White Australia
policy so many decades ago. In doing so they have, directly or indirectly,
fuelled the latent racism of a hostile minority in the community. There has
been, during the period of this debate, a disturbing increase in the occurrence
of racist incidents abuse, graffiti, broken windows, slashed tyres.”
Pauline Hanson was disendorsed by the Liberal Party for the
Queensland seat of Oxley before the 1996 election for her openly racist
remarks. But she stood, and was elected, as an independent. Her maiden
speech was notable for its explicit racism:
“I and most Australians want our immigration policy
radically reviewed and that of multiculturalism abolished. I believe we are in
danger of being swamped by Asians. Between 1984 and 1995, 40% of all migrants
coming into this country were of Asian origin. They have their own culture and
religion, form ghettos and do not assimilate. Of course, I will be called
racist but, if I can invite whom I want into my home, then I should have the
right to have a say in who comes into my country.”
The reaction against an open nation and a non-racist
immigration policy had simmered for a decade but, with that speech, came to a
head. Its traces can now be seen in the current discussion of housing
shortages, which are almost solely being blamed on immigration.
But a look at the evidence shows how hollow that accusation
is. Governments have withdrawn almost entirely from providing new public
housing, leaving a gap that cannot be filled entirely by profit-driven property
developers. In the 1950s, one new dwelling in three was being built by
government. Today, that’s down to 2%.
There are political risks in demonising migrants, as One
Nation (and its poor-relation followers in the Liberal Party) are doing. The
Liberals, at least, ought to know better, having lost a large proportion of
migrant voters who once voted for them but who now support Labor. That dynamic
was plain to see at the last election, when migrant-heavy seats helped the
Albanese government back into office with a thumping majority. The most notable
switch in support came in seats with large Chinese-born populations.
Despite claims by Pauline Hanson and others that migrants
form ghettos, they mostly don’t. With the exception of Tasmania, the migrant
population is fairly evenly spread across the nation.
Nor is it true to say, as Hanson did, that Australia is
being “swamped” by Asians. It’s true that in some places Asian people are
visible: in the Sydney CBD on an ordinary day, the next face you see is as
likely to be Asian as Caucasian. But so what? There is no evidence of any recent
significant or disruptive “ghetto” formation: the most recent that could get
that reputation were refugees from South Vietnam at Cabramatta and Lebanese
people in south-west Sydney, fleeing their country’s murderous civil war. But
that was in the 1970s, half a century ago. Overwhelmingly Asian people fit
easily into Australian society. Geoffrey Blainey thought the culture would be
disrupted. In fact, it’s doing fine. We are still Australians, no matter where
we were born.
The figures easily show that if Australia is being
“overwhelmed” by anyone, it’s by … Australians. No other region of the world
accounts for more than a small fraction, and the biggest of those fractions Europe.
That includes Britain and Ireland.
Despite never-ending invitations to panic, migration
continues to have strong support. The evidence shows the support has not
materially changed over the past 20 years, despite the bursts of “populist”
rhetoric. How popular, then, is this form of populism?
Breaking the figures down further shows the diversity of
Australia’s immigrant population. This is not a monolithic crowd of lookalikes.
In 2024-25, net overseas migration data showed that just over 300,000 people
came from the whole of Asia, including both India and China. That represented
just over two-thirds of all migration for that year.
Acceptance – and rejection – of the government’s migration
policy have shown unusual gyrations, disrupted first by the pandemic lockdowns
(when migration was stifled to almost nothing) and then by the post-pandemic
catch-up and then by the issue’s shrill politicisation by One Nation and by the
Liberals following in One Nation’s wake.
The underlying impact on public opinion is more difficult to see.
Generally, support for migrants and migration has barely shifted, beyond the
pandemic-induced bump.
The lack of vision is evident across the spectrum of
Australian politics and is now producing cruel dilemmas, particularly in
immigration but in many other areas too. The situation of permanently-temporary
migrants is one. Right now, there are some 1.7 million people – six per cent of
the population – on temporary visas. Many are working in jobs well below their
skill capacities. They have little or no access to healthcare, secure housing
or job security. The visa system gives to employers opportunities for gross
exploitation. But Australia relies on these people to undertake a vast range of
jobs, particularly in service industries like health and hospitality.
The current political debate is a classic case of
victim-blaming. One Nation, followed by the Liberal-National coalition parties,
want migration to go into reverse, despite clear evidence that the nation would
suffer badly under such a scenario.
Research
by the Committee for the Economic Development of Australia concluded that “recent
waves of migrants have not had an adverse impact on the wages or jobs of
Australian born workers”. So if migrants are not occupying jobs that
Australians want, who would do those jobs if migrants weren’t available?
It’s basic stuff. But the centre-right of Australian
politics is blindly pursuing populism rather than looking like an alternative
government and the centre-left is all but mute. Vision?
But political vision implies that governments will do more
than they do more at the moment. That means money, which also means, usually,
taxes. The money has to come from somewhere.
For the federal government, welfare is the biggest expense
(36% of the total) and health is second (15%). For the states, it’s health. In
both areas, spending has risen sharply, far overtaking any increases in tax
revenue.
A recent report
from the Grattan Institute outlined the problem, and offered solutions:
“Over the past two decades, Australia’s national public debt
as a share of the economy has increased almost five-fold,” the report said.
“Outside of the COVID pandemic, the last time Australian
governments owed this much, the country was still paying off debt from a world
war. And spending pressures will only build over the decades ahead. An ageing
population will drive healthcare spending higher, and more frequent and severe
natural disasters caused by climate change will present mounting bills for all
governments.
“Australia’s current tax system can’t meet this fiscal
challenge.”
The institute recommended significant tax increases,
together with some offsetting reductions. But those recommendations will go
nowhere. They are too politically difficult, and the Albanese government
doesn’t like political difficulty.
As the chart above shows, the states’ share of debt is also
rising rapidly. For the states, that’s disproportionately caused by rising
healthcare costs.
As a nation, we need to raise more tax. The most obvious
source is from exports of natural gas, currently taxed at minimal rates. The
Australia Institute has calculated
that a 25% tax on gas exports would raise $17 billion a year (almost $50
million per day) – enough to put the whole nation on a very difference fiscal
course. That money could fund (for instance) free tertiary education for the
whole of Australia. But the industry and its foreign owners, predictably,
objected, and the government supported the global mining giants instead.
The Prime Minister, speaking
to a mining industry conference in Western Australia, quickly ruled the option
out. “It shows the Albanese government’s capture by the gas industry,” said
independent senator David Pocock.
Once again: where’s the vision?
The examples keep on coming, but they add up to two things.
One: a government merely concerned with minding the
day-to-day administration, blind to fundamental challenges, knowable and unforeseeable,
that cannot be shirked forever.
And two: the people of this country have stopped believing
their government will do the right thing. In 2010, OECD
data showed 63% answered positively to this question. In 2024, 49% did. The
trajectory is heading downwards.












