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Australia is now a one-party state. What price democracy?

Governments need functioning oppositions to keep them in check. Australia no longer has one of those.


It was the most famous victory of our time. Anthony Albanese, a man who has been “under-estimated my entire life”, led the Labor Party into a landslide of a scale that it has seen only once before in its 133-year history. And, for the first time since federation in 1901, there is now no functioning opposition and no alternative government anywhere in sight.

There have been even bigger landslides before, but this one is different. Labor now has 62.7% of the seats in the House of Representatives, but in 1943 the Curtin wartime government got 65.3%. Conservative parties have done even better: 66.1% in 1966; 69.4% in 1977; and 71.7% – a record still unsurpassed – in 1975.

None of those victories was so momentous, or potentially so alien to basic democratic principles, as this one. If there is no viable alternative, your vote means nothing.

Even after losing to the biggest landslides of the past, the defeated parties were able to reconstitute themselves. They remained mass movements and, once their leaders and policies became electable again, they were ready to govern again.

After the 1943 wipeout of the United Australia Party under the veteran Billy Hughes, its former leader, Robert Menzies, was able to reassemble the shattered pieces – including various breakaway groups – into a new “broad church” Liberal Party. Just six years after the great defeat, the conservatives returned to government and stayed there for 23 years.

Labor’s was kept in the wilderness for a generation only because its Catholic Right in Victoria and Queensland split from the party and formed a new force, the Democratic Labor Party, whose preferences always went to the Liberals.

The 1966 election was fought on the Vietnam War, which Labor opposed and the conservatives embraced. But the war quickly lost popularity, Labor’s principled stand was vindicated, and the path was ready for Whitlam’s brief but historic victory.

For all but three of the 34 years between 1949 and 1983, the ALP was out of federal office. But for all its travails, it remained a mass movement with wide national support and many thousands of members. It was down, never out.The Liberals now have a lower share of seats than Labor had in 1949 or 1966, and almost as low as the 1975 Labor wipeout. Even more seriously, the Liberal Party is no longer a mass movement with a large and active membership. The catastrophic loss in 2025 was not because of a bad campaign or the wrong leader, though both of these made their situation worse and hastened the end. It was because the party had been moving inexorably to the right while the country had been moving to the left.

The Liberals were once distinguishable from their Country/National coalition partners but they no longer are. The party is now overwhelmingly populated by hard-right ideologues with no desire or capacity to change.

There is no way back from here.

The problem for Australia is not the removal of the Liberal Party from the political contest: they are no longer capable of understanding the country or its people. The problem is that there is now only one party capable of forming government. The Greens, out on the left of the spectrum, cannot. Nor, by their very nature, can independents form the core of a government.

Until a new grouping is formed, Australia will remain a one-party state, with the affairs of the nation horse-traded between the unattractive factional warlords of the Labor Party.

The electoral consequences of Mr Howard

John Howard’s greatest contribution to the welfare of Australia is that he set in train the process of making his own party unelectable.

Howard often described himself, accurately, as “the most conservative leader the Liberal Party has ever had”. When he came to power in 1996, he set about remaking the party in his own image.

Moderates were sidelined. Some left politics altogether and were replaced by conservatives. Those who remained were required to abandon their professed ideals in order to secure position and power. A favourite tactic was to place potential factional opponents into portfolios which forced them to become ever more right-wing: Philip Ruddock and Amanda Vanstone surrendered any moderate credentials by pursuing, as immigration ministers, the most racist and punitive approach to migration since the collapse of the White Australia Policy.

The savagery of the Howard government’s anti-union policies were quickly dramatized by the waterfront dispute of 1998. The Industrial Relations minister, Peter Reith, devised a plan to sack the unionised employees of a radical-right company, Patrick Stevedores, and replace them with a union-busting workforce newly trained in Dubai. The initiative came from Reith, not from the company, and  it was so sensitive that the matter was kept secret even from the cabinet itself.

When the cabinet papers were released in 2018, The Guardian Australia reported:

“Australians witnessed unprecedented tactics: guards with dogs removed the unionised workers from the docks; non-unionised labour wearing balaclavas were bussed in and the MUA resorted to an untried tactic of taking action in the federal court as it fought for its very survival.

“The union won in the courts, but the waterfront dispute would prove to be a major shift in the balance of industrial relations, away from union power and towards employers.”

Political strategies that demonise the outsider and target an external threat can be extraordinarily successful in diverting attention from a government’s real performance. Groups which appear different from the majority, but who have no power to argue back, are ideal: Asians, Muslims, boat people, dole ‘bludgers’, African gangs.

Two incidents in the lead-up to the 2001 election epitomise the Howard government’s technique: the Tampa affair, and Children Overboard.

A Norwegian freighter, the MV Tampa, had rescued a group of mainly Hazara asylum seekers from their sinking boat in the Indian Ocean. The ship tried to dock at Christmas Island – in accordance with international law – to disembark the refugees, who had suffered lethal discrimination in their homeland, Afghanistan.

Howard, aware that he was breaching international law, refused the Tampa permission to dock. Heavily armed SAS troops stormed he vessel, lined the refugees up on the deck before being forcibly transferring them to an Australian navy ship and taken to Nauru.

“We will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in which they come,” thundered the Prime Minister. Kim Beazley, the timid and risk-averse opposition leader, caved in. In doing so, he tied the Labor Party forever to the punitive and racist policies that could only ever help the conservative side of politics, never the progressive side.

The incident, coming just a month before the 9/11 attacks in New York, gave the government an immediate and substantial lift in the polls, setting them on a path to win an election they had been likely to lose.

And they kept up the pressure, seizing the community’s fear of terrorism and magnifying it into a potent weapon of fear and hatred of all undocumented migrants, even the most innocent. It made Australia a nastier, crueller place; but it won the election.

Then came Children Overboard. The Immigration Minister, Philip Ruddock, claimed asylum seekers being rescued from a sinking boat had thrown their children overboard to save themselves. The lie was repeated by Reith and Howard even after they knew it was untrue. By the time the public learned the truth, the election was over.

The themes established by Howard were continued under his acolyte, Tony Abbott, who led the next Liberal government into power in 2013. By now, the magic had ceased to work and Abbott’s hard-line economic and social approach saw him dumped from the job by colleagues after only two years. The Liberals limped on in office until 2022 but the party was already over.

Australia had changed. They hadn’t.

All through the time that John Howard, Tony Abbott, Malcolm Turnbull and Scott Morrison sat in the Prime Minister’s chair, changes were happening in Australian society that nobody in the Liberal Party seemed to notice. As they moved further to the right, the country was going the other way.

It’s largely about demographics. Young people tend to be more progressive than their elders, and that’s still the case. But each generation is a bit more left-wing than the last, and younger generations are now much more likely to retain their progressive ideas as they get older.

Benjamin Disraeli, among many others, said that “a man who is not a Liberal at sixteen has no heart; a man who is not a Conservative at sixty has no head.” If it was ever true, it is no longer.

The Australian Election Study provides the most comprehensive evidence of the changing attitudes of voters. Simultaneously with each federal election, researchers from the Australian National University conduct extensive and revealing polls of voters. Like all polls, they are subject to sampling error, particularly when the sample is broken down into smaller groups. Nevertheless, the trends after more than three decades are unmistakeable.

People over 65, who began voting long before Howard’s ascendancy, have mostly maintained their allegiances, even as younger people join their ranks. But all other age-groups have moved decisively to the left. It’s particularly noticeable among 18-to-24 year olds (red solid line) and 55-to-65 year olds (black dotted line). The middle point of Australians’ political outlook is now left of centre.

In 1996, women tended still to be more conservative than men, but that long-standing trend has now decisively reversed. (The apparent return to the political centre by women in 2022, shown in this graph, looks like a statistical blip.) But there is also evidence that after a long plateau, the attitudes of Australian men, particularly young men, have since 2022 become more closely aligned with those of women. Labor’s landslide indicates that this is now being strongly reflected in votes.

In the new political climate, union-bashing is much less effective. When the Howard government came to power in 1996, the community was evenly split on whether unions, or big business, had too much power. Wave after wave of union-busting legislation changed that perception: by the time Howard lost the 2007 election, only 37% of voters thought the unions were too powerful – but 70% thought big business was.

At the 2004 election, the Liberal-National coalition gained, for the first time, majorities in the House of Representatives and the Senate. Changes which once seemed impossible were now achievable, or so they thought. Howard’s long-term passion was to swing industrial power away from employees and towards business: a new system, WorkChoices, would achieve that by further deregulating employment, mandating individual contracts over collective bargaining, crippling or abandoning unfair dismissal laws, winding back the award system and lowering minimum pay standards.

It was massive overreach. At the subsequent election the government lost power and the Prime Minister lost his seat.

Australians are much less afraid than they were during Howard’s ascendancy. Scare campaigns about terrorism helped keep the conservative parties in power and wedged Labor powerfully. But despite a temporary increase in fear levels after the Lindt Café siege in Sydney in 2014, the trend has been sharply downwards, with women consistently less afraid than men.

There are still enough votes in racism to keep Pauline Hanson in the Senate, but nowhere near enough for any party to win government. For every vote now gained by migrant-bashing, many more are likely to be lost.

But racism has a long and deeply-ingrained history in Australia. It didn’t take long after European settlement for China to be cast in the permanent role of threatening monster. Chinese miners on the goldfields in the mid-19th century were vilified, subject to race riots and expelled from the diggings and from the country. One of the first laws passed by the newly federated parliament was the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901, better known as the White Australia Policy.

No foreign country, including China, is capable of landing and maintaining a hostile force on the Australian mainland. And what would they gain from trying? Without access to Australian raw materials, growth as spectacular as that of the past four decades would not have been possible. They need us and we need them.

The old fear of China remains and is easily awakened, as Malcolm Turnbull did in 2017 (having nearly lost the previous year’s election) when he proclaimed that Australia was “standing up” to China. In this, he was assisted by Xi Jinping’s asinine wolf warrior diplomacy and bullying in its offshore waters. But bad behaviour is typical of big powers and China’s is still nowhere near as egregious as that of the United States.

There was no good reason, then, why the proportion of people thinking China was a military threat should rise suddenly from 46% in 2017 to 75% by 2022. There was just one bad reason, and that was Malcolm Turnbull’s beating his war-drum in December 2017 and the subsequent bellicosity of Peter Dutton and his (now disgraced) department head, Mike Pezzullo.

Scott Morrison won the 2019 election against an unelectable Labor offering, but that had nothing obvious to do with China. Unless there’s an actual war on, there are few votes in foreign policy.

Only since the change of government, and the restoration of more prudent relations, has the fear begun to ebb. A great deal of damage was done, not only to agricultural exporters, by this episode.

But it did not accomplish the goal of winning elections or of making Turnbull look like a strong and capable leader. Eight months after his foray into dingo-warriorism, he was tipped out of office in a palace revolt.

Climate change is the greatest challenge facing humanity, but the conservative parties prefer to ignore it. The Lowy Institute poll reveals that serious climate action is now being demanded by a majority in all age groups, most dramatically among people under 30, who will have to live with a new and much less amenable world.

Moderates won’t save the Libs

The notion that returning moderates to the Liberal Party will revive its fortunes is a hallucination. They cannot.

Even if the dominant right-wingers were suddenly to relent, and enough moderates could be found, and enough seats could be found for them, it would make little difference. The problems go much deeper.

The difference between the party’s moderate and conservative wings is exclusively about social policy. On economic and fiscal policy, they are as one. They all subscribe passionately to an ideology that most Australians now reject: small government, fiscal austerity, free markets, deregulation, privatisation, tax cuts and trickle-down economics. That liberal (or neoliberal) ideology has led them first to oppose and then to degrade Medicare and the PBS, slash university funding, increase student debt, preferentially fund private over public schools, oppose competition laws, sideline trade unions and give tax breaks to business.

Over at least the past two decades, the National Party’s influence in the coalition has grown and is now at a historical high-point. Although the proportion of all parliamentary seats (for both houses) held by the Nationals has fallen since its heyday in the 1970s, the decline has been much less than its has been for the Liberals. Calculations based on the new election results indicate that in the joint party room, where the most significant decisions are made, the two parties are more equal than ever before: probably about 17% versus 11% of all parliamentary seats. The accusation of the tail wagging the dog is now inapposite: the dog is now little bigger than the tail. Liberal numbers were artificially boosted by half the Senate not being up for re-election. If not for that, the two parties would now be even more equal.

The Country Party (now the Nationals) began in 1920 to represent small farmers: people occupying small blocks or “selections” which were often insufficient to maintain an income above the bare subsistence level. Wealthier graziers – “squatters” – supported the established conservative parties.

From the beginning, the Country Party pursued policies of agrarian socialism: price support schemes, subsidies and marketing pools. A coalition with the Nationalist Party, a forerunner of the Liberals, quickly followed and has persisted, with occasional hiccups, ever since. But as rural areas lost population to the cities, and small farmers merged or were taken over, the original constituency diminished.

“They’re not going to disappear,” ABC election analyst Antony Green told The Monthly in 2018. “The coalition agreement protects them in their weakened state. But they’re not about to grow. They’re struggling to maintain a separate identity to the Liberal Party. That’s their biggest problem.”

Today, the Nationals’ connection with farming is far weaker than their connection with big mining companies. That, after all, is where the money is. This explains the Nationals’ adherence to coal mining and their hostility to climate action. In this, they have succeeded in coercing the Liberals into a climate policy which is clearly unacceptable to a growing majority of voters.

Both parties now struggle to maintain relevance in a changing society. They now share the same conservative attitudes to social issues and their economic position is terminally confused.

What now for democracy?

Between 1949 and 1983, the conservative coalition was in government for all but three years. Labor is now unassailable in the way the coalition never has been, and is likely to be in power for at least a generation.

But the party’s support is less solid than it looks. All parties need members at branch level to fight the ground game in each campaign – door-knocking, putting up corflutes, raising money. Party bosses are cagey about how many members they have, but acknowledge a severe decline. The Liberals had 197,000 in the 1950s; in 2022 the party’s former federal treasurer, Michael Yabsley, put the figure at around 40,000 across all state and federal divisions.

“The inescapable truth is the Liberal Party is not a mass-membership organisation,” he wrote. “It should be and likes to pretend it is. Nowhere was that more apparent than during the recent [2022] six-week campaign in many of the now-teal seats, where Liberal Party workers were hopelessly outnumbered.”

The party is not saying how many have left since then but numbers are said to be in “freefall”.

In 2020, the ALP’s federal secretary, Paul Erickson, said Labor had 60,085 members around the nation. Inevitably, many of those are inactive. Those numbers are probably now increasing, but are still at near-historical lows. In both parties, an unknown number are the result of branch-stacking exercise. Some may not even know they have been signed up.

Membership of trade unions, the Labor Party’s bedrock, stood at 51% of all employees in 1976. By 2024, that had plummeted to 12.5%.

The extent to which the parties have lost their connection with the people of Australia is also seen in voter allegiances. In the past, people knew well in advance of an election who they were going to vote for. Now they don’t. It’s a major challenge for established parties and an opportunity for newcomers.

Only about a third of all voters can now be said to be loyal to a single party.

There is no comfort here for Labor. Over the past 30 years solid, predictable voter support sank to even lower levels than for the conservatives. Left-of-centre voters now have more choices.

Voters are less trusting of those with political power. Split-ticket voting – supporting a different party in each house – is now twice as common as it was in the 1980s and early 1990s.

And here’s why. The people who run the country, do not have the confidence of the  people. Across all age groups, Australians no longer believe that government is of the people or by the people – and certainly not for the people.

Supporters of all major parties have remarkably similar views. They don’t trust anyone. Again, this is not good news for Labor, however unassailable its grip on power now is.

All governments tire with time. This one will be no different.

Governments run out of ideas and out of talent. These dangers are magnified when they face no real risk of being tipped out of office. When they have been in power for too long – typically, for longer than 10 or 12 years – governments become arrogant and hubristic, seeming to regard themselves as the nation’s owners rather than the people. The arrogance of which Labor is eminently capable was on display only six days after the election when Richard Marles, Deputy Prime Minister, Defence Minister and Factional Assassin-In-Chief, purged two of the most effective ministers from the front bench to make room for less-talented factional buddies.

The most extreme Australian example of the evils of longevity is provided by the Country/National Party government of Queensland under Frank Nicklin and Joh Bjelke-Petersen. The party came to power in 1957, benefiting from the great Labor split, and remained there until 1989. Along the way, that government became notorious: increasingly authoritarian, reviling any opponent, installing cronies in positions of power and profit and presiding over a culture of criminal corruption.

They were secured in power by a gerrymandered electoral system which gave a rural vote five times as much value as a city vote. Their Liberal coalition partners got more votes but always fewer seats. In 1972, Bjelke-Petersen’s party gained only 20% of the popular vote but 32% of the seats. Together, the coalition got 42% of the popular vote and 57% of seats.

There are no longer any gerrymanders in the Australian electoral system, but the monopoly on power now enjoyed by the Labor Party produces the same result. There are, though, more checks and balances than in Joh’s Queensland: an independent High Court and, most significantly, an upper house in which governments seldom have a majority, and which can defeat legislation and disallow regulations. But the Senate cannot effectively initiate policies or, usually, prevent government from doing (or not doing) whatever it wants; and in a parliamentary system, the separation of powers between the executive and the legislature is blurred, reducing accountability.

Without the emergence of a new political force, Australia will not have a viable alternative government to Labor. It is unlikely to be the Greens, whose brief sojourn in the chamber of government demonstrated their fundamental unsuitability. The electorate has returned them to the role of night-watchman in the Senate that was once entrusted to the Democrats.

It’s not the Teals either. Unless they can organise themselves into a party with coherent policy and leadership, they will at best be restricted to the fringes of actual power. They will have to explain in detail, for the first time, what they stand for. As renegade Liberals, do they still share an attraction for hardline neoliberal policies: small government, low taxes, the sanctity of the market? What values, beyond climate change and administrative integrity, do they share?

Any close collaboration between the Teals and the Greens is unlikely to the point of absurdity. They are too different.

The prospects of a revival in competitive parliamentary democracy are dim. An ideal result would be a new and vital centre-left party with a clear vision for change and the capacity to inspire enthusiasm in the electorate and passion among its followers. The reality is that no new party capable of governing has emerged in at least eighty years.

Within a decade or so, this government will lose impetus and purpose, as they all do. In the past, the remedy has been a period in opposition, allowing renewal of personnel, revision of policies and the rediscovery of a sense of purpose. No such period of opposition beckons now. So the country faces a future characterised by diminishing trust in a government that cannot be removed, a further alienation of the people from those in charge, and a growing conviction that the democracy is not working.

Our last, best hope is that this, in turn, may eventually inspire a new political movement to restore the link between power and the people.






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